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CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-LIABILITY OF ADULT HOST FOR GIVING
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES TO MINOR GUESTS
Dr. and Mrs. George Hughes were found guilty of violating a Con-
necticut statute which forbade the sale of liquor to minors.' They were
each fined $500 for serving alcoholic beverages to their minor guests at
a lawn party. The Circuit Court of Connecticut, Appellate Division,
stated that the legislative intent of liquor control legislation should be
liberally construed in the public welfare to restrain alcoholic indulgence
by minors. Consequently, the statute was determined to apply equally to
permittees and non-permittees who give alcoholic liquors to minors other
than their own children. State v. Hughes, 3 Conn. Cir. 181, 209 A.2d 872
(1965), petition for certification denied, 209 A.2d 189 (1965).
The aftermath of the Hughes lawn party was the death of a seventeen
year old girl in a car collision. The girl was the passenger in a car driven
by another guest. The driver was convicted of recldess driving and neg-
ligent homicide .2 Because of such unfortunate occurrences, the majority of
courts feel that a liberal interpretation of liquor control legislation is
needed.3 The Hughes case shows that legislation which prohibits the sale
of liquor to minors can include the gift of alcoholic beverages to minors
by a non-licensee, even though such acts occur in the privacy of a home.
The defendants contended that the Connecticut statute4 dealt primarily
with commercial liquor traffic, relying heavily on the belief of Professor
Wharton to the effect that when such a statute appears from its title to
1 CONN. GEN. STAT. ch. 545, § 30-86 (1958): "Sales to minors ... Any permitee who,
by himself, his servant, or agent, sells or delivers alcoholic liquor to any minor . . . and
any person, except the parent or guardian of a minor, who delivers or gives any such
liquors to such minors, except on the order of a practicing physician, shall be subject
to the penalties of section 30-113."
2 TIME, Oct. 23, 1964, p. 59.
3 There is no universal judicial policy adopted by the courts in construing liquor
control laws, although the prevailing and preferred construction given by the various
jurisdictions is a liberal interpretation.
3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 7203 (3rd. ed. 1943); State v. Small, 99 N.H.
349, 111 A.2d 201 (1955); Commonwealth v. Randall, 183 Pa. Super. 603, 133 A.2d 276
(1957); State v. Mapes, 248 Iowa 39, 79 N.W.2d 202 (1956); Parkinson v. State, 14 Md.
184, 74 A.D. 522 (1859); Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 431 (1876). Accord, Commonwealth
v. Davis, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 240 (1876). See State v. Sifford, 51 N.M. 430, 187 P.2d 540
(1947); State v. Cummings, 63 N.M. 337, 319 P.2d 946 (1957); State v. Stock, 169 Minn.
364, 211 N.W. 319 (1926); People ex rel. Krause v. Harrison, 191 II. 257, 61 N.E. 99
(1901); United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354 (1926). Silverhorn v. State, 358 P.2d 226
(1960). Contra, People v. Armstrong, 24 Misc, 2d 53, 203 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1960). But see
Albrecht v. People, 78 111. 510 (1875).
4 Supra note I.
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relate to the business of manufacturing, selling and giving of intoxicating
beverages to minors, it does not prohibit the giving of intoxicating liquors
as a mere act of hospitality of the home.5 The defendants claimed their
acts were not embraced within the terms of the statute, since their acts
were those of a host being hospitable to a guest in the host's own resi-
dence. The defendants contended that if the latter portion of the perti-
nent section of the statute, including the phrase "and any person," was
construed otherwise, it would be the only non-commercial regulation of
the use of alcohol within the entire Liquor Control Act, and would there-
fore be inconsistent with the general nature of it. Liberal interpretation
of this statute would most certainly subject the defendant to liability.
This construction would extend liability to any person who delivers liq-
uor to a minor, rather than restrict the statute's application to individuals
involved in commercial transactions.
Moreover, defendants urged the court to apply the statutory rule of
construction, ejusdem generis, in order to show that it was not the intent
of the legislature to include non-permittees in the phrase "and any per-
son." The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that where "general words
follow specific words in an enumeration describing the legal subject, the
general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature
to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words. . . ." De-
fendants argued that "any person" referred only to words similar to any
permittee, his servant or agent. Courts in New Hampshire and Pennsyl-
vania have analyzed statutes7 similar to that of Connecticut in regard to
delivery of intoxicating beverages to minors by non-licensees, and, as in
Hughes, the defendants' arguments advocating ejusdem generis were un-
successful. 8
Courts cannot apply this rule of statutory construction to defeat the
legislative intent by confining the operation of a statute within narrower
53 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 1045 (12th ed. 1957).
62 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4909 (3rd ed. 1943).
7 In the following statutes, as in the Connecticut Act under consideration, the legis-
lative intent is clear; that is, the statutes will apply to any person who gives liquor to a
minor:
NEW HAMP. REV. STAT., ch. 175, § 6 (1955): "Prohibited Sales. No licensee, sales agent,
nor any other person, shall sell or give away or cause or permit or procure to be sold,
delivered or given away any liquor or beverage to a minor .. ." (emphasis added).
PENN. STAT. ANN., tit. 47, § 4-493 (1951): "Unlawful acts relative to liquor, malt, and
brewed beverages and licensees. It shall be unlawful (1) For any licensee or the board,
or any employee, servant or agent of such licensee or of the board, or any other person,
to sell, furnish or give any liquor or malt or brewed beverages to be sold, furnished,
or given, to ... any minor .. ." (emphasis added).
8 State v. Small, 99 N.H. 349, 111 A.2d 201 (1955); Commonwealth v. Randall, 183
Pa. Super. 603, 133 A.2d 276 (1957).
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limits that the lawmakers clearly express.9 The United States Supreme
Court succinctly appraised the rule's effect in Helvering v. Stockholm's
Enskilda Bank1° and recognized that it is only one of many canons of
statutory construction which must be applied to determine the true legis-
lative intent of a statute. The Court stated:
If upon a consideration of the context and objects sought to be attained, and
of the act as a whole, it adequately appears that the general words were not
used in the restricted sense suggested by the rule, we must give effect to the
conclusion afforded by the wider view in order that the will of the legislature
shall not fail.1 '
The Connecticut court, through its examination of the Act as a whole,
and the latter portion of the pertinent section in particular, held that this
specific section has been in effect without significant change for over
fifty years.1 2 On the basis of the language of the statute, the rule of
ejusdem generis was held inapplicable. Should the court have applied
the doctrine, the intent of the legislature would have been destroyed.
The court's holding emphasizes that the section of the statute directly
under review has only one objective: to prevent minors from acquiring
liquor "through the act of any intervening human agency, unless ex-
empted by statute.' u3 In regard to the issue of serving liquor to a minor
in a private home as an act of hospitality, if a minor is actually served
in a jurisdiction where there is a statute which prohibits any person from
delivering or giving liquor to a minor, the fact that the act occurred in
a private home does not sanctify it and make it legal. Sales of intoxicants
to minors is uniformly prohibited in all jurisdictions as a matter of public
welfare. Where the terms of a statute are broad, gratuitously supplying
liquor to minors has long been considered an indictable offense in such
jurisdictions.' 4 If a statute prohibits either the giving or furnishing of
9 It is to be noted that ejusdem generis as a rule of construction, applies primarily
if there is no clear manifestation of a legislative intent that the general term be given
a broader meaning than the doctrine requires. For further expansion, see 2 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION S 4910 (3rd ed. 1943); 50 AM. JUR. Statutes § 250 (1944).
See also, People ex rel. County of Du Page v. Smith, 21111. 2d 572,173 N.E.2d 485 (1961).
10 293 U.S. 84 (1934).
11 ld. at 88. Accord, U.S. v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950), wherein the court refused
to apply ejusdem generis to a defendant who had shipped obscene phonograph records
in violation of a statute making illegal interstate shipment of obscene book, pamphlet,
picture, motion-picture film, or other matter of indecent character. The Court indicated
that such application of the rule would defeat the obvious legislative intent.
12 CONN. PUBLIC AcTs ch. 10, p. 7 (1913).
13 State v. Hughes, 209 A.2d 872, 880 (Conn. 1965).
14 BLACK, INTOXICATING LIoUORS, § 415, (1892). For example, in Commonwealth v.
Davis, supra note 2, defendant, a nonlicensee, was convicted for providing a minor
with liquor in exchange for money furnished by the minor. This transaction was
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liquors to minors, the law has been extended to both liquor dealers and
to those who buy liquor and furnish it to the minors. Alcoholic beverage
control statutes are generally enacted with the intent they will serve both
as penal and remedial legislation. Black's Law Dictionary defines a remedial
statute as one "that is designed to correct an existing law .... or introduce
regulations conducive to the public good. 15 Courts recognize that remedial
statutes require a liberal construction in order to give effect to the manifest
purpose for which the legislation was enacted, 16 and one basic intent
of liquor control legislation is to be remedial of abuses inherent in
liquor traffic.' 7 The intent of remedial legislation that prohibits any person
from giving liquor to minors, like legislation prohibiting such sales, is also
in furtherance of the public welfare. Whether the act of extending liquor
to minors occurs in the home or a business establishment, saloon, or res-
taurant is not important. Liability for the act attaches to the issuer of such
intoxicants.
The court's opinion expressed the view that such application would also
violate other equally important rules of statutory interpretation, including
the canon against redundancy,' and the rule which requires that effect be
given to every word in a statute.19 Effect must be given, if possible, to
every word, clause, and sentence of a statute so that no part will be in-
operative or superfluous, void or insignificant.2 0 If the words "any person"
in the Connecticut Act had reference only to those persons involved in a
transaction with minors on commercial premises which are licensed to sell
intoxicants, the phrase would be redundant and superfluous because those
individuals had been previously enumerated within the section.
To alleviate the statutory construction difficulties created by such prob-
lems, Illinois amended its liquor control statute in 1963, to include a pro-
in violation of a statute which made it an offense for any person to sell, lend, or give
any liquor to a minor. In State v. Adamson, 14 Ind. 296 (1860), defendant, a nonlicensee,
was convicted for giving liquor to a minor in violation of a statute entitled "An Act to
regulate and license the sale of liquors." The Act made it an offense to sell, barter,
or give away any intoxicating liquor to a minor. The court held that the giving was
properly connected with subject of the title, because it should be regarded as a necessary
incident to a statute regulating the sale. See also, Johnson v. People, 83 111. 431 (1876).
Contra, People v. Bird, 138 Mich. 31, 100 N.W. 1003, (1904).
15 BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
16 Merchant's Bank & Trust Co. v. Pettison, 112 Conn. 652, 654, 153 At. 789, 790
(1931).
17 Blank v. Mayor & Borough Council of Magnolia, 38 N.J. 484, 185 A.2d 862 (1962).
18 50 AM. JUR. Statutes § 359 (1944). See U.S. ex rel. Boscola v. Bledsoe, 152 F. Supp.
343, 345 (N.D. Wash. 1956).
102 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONS 4705 (3rd ed. 1943).
2 0 See State v. Bartley, 39 Neb. 353, 58 N.W. 172 (1894).
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gressive remedial liquor control provision which prohibits the gift of
alcoholic liquor to a minor by anyone. 21 This amendment corrected in-
herently defective legislation which had prohibited only licensees from
giving intoxicants to minors.22 At this writing, no court of review has con-
strued this amendment in regard to the issue of a non-licensee furnishing
liquor to minors in a private home.23
The holding in the case at bar represents the definite trend toward liberal
interpretation of liquor control statutes. Legislation prohibiting liquor sales
or gifts to minors includes gifts of intoxicating beverages to minors at
private parties in the home. The legislative intent has clearly been to re-
strain consumption of alcoholic liquor by minors. In order to implement
the legislative intent, courts are finding it necessary to reject the statutory
rule of construction, ejusdem generis, which would place a strict inter-
pretation on the phrase any person, in favor of rules which require that
every word in a statute be construed so that none are redundant or super-
fluous. Preference for this latter construction affirms the trend toward
liberal interpretation of alcoholic beverage control laws.
James Burstein
21 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, S 131 (1963). It is interesting to note that the Liquor Control
Act was amended in 1965 to allow minors to consume alcoholic beverages in the privacy
of a home under the direct supervision and approval of the parents. 73rd ILL. GEN. Ass.
H. B. 470, approved August 6, 1965, amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 134(a) (1963).
22 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, S 38 (1934): "No licensee shall give, or deliver alcoholic
liquor to any minor ......
23 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (1963). This amendment has not been construed upto
and including cases reported in 209 N.E. 2d 648 (1965). See also, Comment, 37 CH.-KENT
L. REV. 123 (1960), wherein the commentator suggested that a non-commercial host
may be liable in tort "[d]espite reported decisions touching on the matter of non-
commercial host liability, in the face of the legislative intent and other persuasive
elements, it seems reasonable to conclude a corporate host who conducts an Office
Christmas Party or Hospitality Room serving intoxicating beverages will find itself
subject to civil damages as a tortfeasor under the Liquor Control Act." (Id. at 128.)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT SUPREME
COURT DECISION-RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF
JACKSON v. DENNO'
In 1960, Charles Huntley was tried for first degree robbery. A complete
confession by the defendant was entered into evidence, and in accord-
ance with existing New York procedure, the issue of the voluntariness
of the confession was submitted as a question of fact to the same jury
that determined guilt. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty with-
1 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
